Helmi Noman

Tender Confirmed, Rights At Risk: Verifying Netsweeper in Bahrain

In this report, we confirm the use of the services of Canadian company Netsweeper, Inc. to censor access to the Internet in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Helmi Noman publishes report on Atheist content in Arab cyberspace

Citizen Lab Senior Researcher Helmi Noman contributed another report to the Internet Monitor, a research project that evaluates the extent of internet controls across the world, run by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.

Helmi Noman interviewed regarding hack of Quebec municipality

Citizen Lab Senior Researcher Helmi Noman was interviewed by MSN on the recent hack attack against a Quebec municipality west of Montreal called Terrasse-Vaudreuil.

Helmi Noman interviewed for piece on Syrian Electronic Army

Citizen Lab Senior Researcher Helmi Noman was interviewed by the International Business Times regarding the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), and its attack of several international news sites. The SEA is a group of hackers in support of Syrian President Bashar-al-Assad’s regime, known to target opposition political group.

Monitoring Information Controls in Iraq in Reaction to ISIS Insurgency

In this report, we document the results of network measurement tests we ran to determine how the Internet is being filtered in Iraq in reaction to ongoing insurgency in the country. The results identify 20 unique URLs that are blocked on three Iraq-based Internet Service Providers. Notably, none of the 7 websites we tested that are affiliated with, or supportive, of the jihadist insurgent group the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) were found to be blocked.

Internet Filtering in a Failed State: The Case of Netsweeper in Somalia

A new Citizen Lab report has found that Canada-based Netsweeper filtering products have been identified on three ISPs in Somalia.

IGF 2013: Islands of Control, Islands of Resistance: Monitoring the 2013 Indonesian IGF (Foreword)

This report, Islands of Control, Islands of Resistance: Monitoring the 2013 Indonesian IGF, is the first in a series of Citizen Lab reports that apply a mixture of methods, from technical interrogation to field research and social and legal analyses, to study information controls in and around particular events. This report focuses on information controls in and around Indonesia’s hosting of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

Monitoring Information Controls During the Bali IGF

On October 22-25, 2013, Indonesia will host the eighth annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the issues and policies of Internet governance. The main theme of this year’s IGF is “Building Bridges: Enhancing Multi-stakeholder Cooperation for Growth and Sustainable Development.”

This post is the first in a series that will explore online freedom of expression and the state of information controls in Indonesia in the context of their role as host of the IGF.

An Indonesian translation of this post is available here.

Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dari halaman ini tersedia disini.

A Method for Identifying and Confirming the Use of URL Filtering Products for Censorship

The paper presents an initial methodology for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products around the world.

After the Green Movement: Internet Controls in Iran, 2009-2012

This report details Iran’s increasing Internet controls since 2009, when protests against the victory of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad rocked the country. The election protest campaign–dubbed the “Green Movement”–was marked for the high use of social media and other information and communication technologies (ICT) to organize protests and disseminate information.