Tag Archives: China

研究发现百度浏览器存在安全与隐私问题

多伦多大学公民实验室的最新报告揭露了百度浏览器存在的多处隐私与安全问题。百度浏览器是基于中国的一款移动浏览器,拥有数百万的用户,而报告反映的隐私与安全问题很可能会至用户的沟通于风险中。

Baidu’s and Don’ts: Privacy and Security Issues in Baidu Browser

This report describes privacy and security issues with Baidu Browser, a web browser for the Windows and Android platforms. Our research shows that the application transmits personal user data to Baidu servers without encryption and with easily decryptable encryption, and is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution during software updates via man-in-the-middle attacks. Much of the data leakage is the result of a shared Baidu software development kit, which affects hundreds of additional applications.

Jason Q. Ng at FIREWALL’s Creative Hacktivism Roundtable

February 26 – New York City

Citizen Lab research cited in Freedom House report

Freedom House has released their “Freedom on the Net 2015” report, placing China at the bottom of a ranking comprising 65 countries. The report cites the Citizen Lab’s research on China, specifically on chat application censorship and targeted threats.

Jason Q. Ng discusses “China’s Rumour Mill” in Foreign Affairs

In an article written for Foreign Affairs, Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng discusses the crackdown of “rumours” on the popular Chinese WeChat mobile application, and its broader implications for censorship in the country.

Jason Q. Ng speaks to the China Economic Review on UC Browser vulnerabilities

Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Jason Q. Ng spoke to the China Economic Review on the findings of the UC Browser report, and the impact of security vulnerabilities on users.

Every Rose Has Its Thorn: Censorship and Surveillance on Social Video Platforms in China

In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.

Information Controls Research at FOCI 2015

At the  2015 USENIX Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) workshop, held in Washington DC on August 10, Citizen Lab and collaborators present three papers.

The papers include: investigation of censorship and surveillance on China’s most popular social video platforms, an updated analysis of China’s Great Canon, and examination of securing cookie-based identifiers from passive surveillance.

Politics, Rumors, and Ambiguity: Tracking Censorship on WeChat’s Public Accounts Platform

This report is an analysis of the types of content removed by WeChat on its public accounts (also known as “official accounts”) blogging platform.

Jason Q. Ng on China’s censorship of online sexual innuendo, messaging applications, and event coverage

China’s censorship of social media platforms has largely been focused on speech that targets or criticizes the government, until recently. The Cyberspace Administration of China’s new regulations will target sexual innuendo, in particular 25 of the most popular “dirty words” in China.